Tag: crime and freedom

Richard Brunstom

Is the North Wales Chief Constable calling for the legalisation of drugs.

While I agree with him, I have my worries about government bodies, such as police forces, campaigning for policy. The idea is that the people campaign, and the government responds. I find it idiotic when government-funded “charities” spend their money on campaigns aimed back at the government which funded them, and it is not really any less idiotic just because I agree with the campaign.

Of course, the question of whether Brunstom should express is personal views is a different one. That’s really between him and his employers — if they attempt to be too restrictive they may find it hard to get good people. It is probably best that he is allowed to speak out.

The Police Authority, indeed, is his employer. It consists of 9 councillors, 3 magistrates and 5 appointed members. The councillors have other venues in which to put forward their political views. Rather than calling for change in the law, they would be better making decisions genuinely within their province as to the North Wales Police. I imagine it is beyond the scope of their discretion to decide not to enforce laws they disagree with, but priorities to a certain extent must be down to them. Let them combine their wisdom with their responsibility.

"The computer did it"

In The Register, the story of a man who got 7 days because when he signed up for facebook, it sent an invitation to “be his friend” to every facebook member whose email address was in his address book — including his ex-wife, whom he was under a court order not to attempt to contact.

He might of course have been lying, but if not he has been punished for what his computer, and facebook’s computers, did on his behalf.

The point is that the law has to decide how much responsibility a person has for what their computer decides to do.
Up till now, the assumption has been that whatever your computer does, is done at your request, and you are wholly responsible. This despite the fact that that has never been true, and is getting further from the truth every year.
There is no legal tradition to apply here. The nearest analogy to the relationship between a person and his computer is the relationship between a man and his dog.
People have kept dogs for thousands — most likely tens of thousands — of years, so everyone has a rough idea what the deal is. The general legal view is that you have a duty to keep your dog from causing harm under foreseeable circumstances, but there is a distinction between what your dog does and what you do. If your dog attacks a child, you are not guilty of Grievous Bodily Harm, but you might be guilty of keeping a dangerous dog. If your dog craps on the street, that is different than if you crap on the street, but you might still be fined.
If you are found guilty of not properly controlling a dog, you can be banned from keeping one. If your dog causes harm and is considered not to be controllable, the court can order it to be destroyed.
(If you deliberately cause your dog to kill someone, that is still murder of course, but your intention is crucial)
This is the only rational legal framework for crimes committed by a computer without the intention of its owner.

Crime: responsibility of victims

In an insightful piece, “David Copperfield” discusses how much responsibility the victim of a crime has for the crime, in a number of different situations, and to what extent, if any, such responsibility should affect his actions as a police officer.

I discussed this question a couple of years ago:

There is a notion that responsibility can be “shared”, which I think is fundamentally misleading. We each make our decisions in an environment that has been made mainly by other people, but to judge any decision, legally or morally, we have to take that environment as given. Many people might have responsibility for any bad outcome, but they have it separately, they do not share it. We might put ourselves at risk of all sorts of dangers, from other people or from other elements of our environment, and if we are wise we will consider our own responsibility as we do so, but if we are the victim of a criminal, his responsibility is not lessened by our risky behaviour.

In the examples Copperfield gives, there are two general categories of responsibility that some victims have: Either they can fail to take ordinary precautions to avoid or prevent crime (failing to lock doors, leaving property unattended in a public place), or else they can deliberately involve themselves in illegal activity (buying goods that are probably stolen, dealing drugs, responding to 419 communications which are generally invitations to share in a theft or fraud).

My answer to his question is that the responsibility, if any, of the victim should not be a primary consideration for him. The reason is that he is not working on behalf of the victim. He is working on behalf of us all, as we all benefit from the rule of law. His job is not to undo the effects of the crime, which in most cases is impossible, but to bring offenders to justice in order to uphold the rule of law.

So what should be important for him is not the status of the victim, but the status of the offender. It might be the case that a thief who grabs a handbag from a pub table is a lesser offender, and a lower priority, than a thief who breaks into a car. I do not think that a mugger who hangs around in a “bad part of town” is a lower priority than one on the high street. Is a drug dealer who shoots other drug dealers a lower priority than a drug dealer who shoots passers-by? Possibly, but it is very marginal.

Human Rights

The European Court of Human Rights yesterday ruled that Human Rights aren’t really rules as such, more sort of guidelines towards the sort of policies that governments might like to consider following, if convenient. (Judgement in O’Halloran and Francis vs United Kingdom [word document {blech}])

Those who choose to keep and drive motor cars can be taken to have accepted certain responsibilities and obligations as part of the regulatory regime relating to motor vehicles, and in the legal framework of the United Kingdom, these responsibilities include the obligation, in the event of suspected commission of road traffic offences, to inform the authorities of the identity of the driver on that occasion.

I did intend to rant enthusiastically about the evil of this decision, calling for all right-thinking freedom-loving folk to take up their pitchforks and march on Strasbourg or wherever the damn thing is.

But at the end of the week, having got to my keyboard, I find I’m not really feeling up to that kind of hypocrisy. I’m just not that into human rights myself. Not that I deny that the individual needs protection from the state — far from it — but a laundry-list of absolute “rights” doesn’t really provide much protection, while at the same time throwing confusion onto the normal functioning of the law. See for instance my old favourite case of Begum vs Denbigh High School, and others.

Viewed in isolation, there is nothing unusually obnoxious about the rule that the keeper of a vehicle must identify (to the best of his knowledge) the driver of the vehicle at the time it was being used to infringe a traffic law. Anyone with a view of freedom that is offended by that must agree that there are many hundreds of equally undesirable laws that have no similar close connection with an alleged human right. The only sensible reason for taking a stand against this law is that Rights once enumerated must be defended even in unimportant cases, so that they remain unarguable in the important cases. Reasonable as that argument sounds, it is a lost cause once your “Rights” include such windbaggery as “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life.” (ECHR 8.1)

So, no ranting. Although, to be fair, whatever I think of human rights, there is some question as to what the point is of a Court of Human Rights that doesn’t believe in human rights.

Anyway, without absolute rights, how are we to be protected from the state? It’s not an easy thing — indeed history tells us that it’s about the most difficult thing of all. I would concentrate on limiting the size and scope of the state, rather than micromanaging what techniques it is allowed to use. Define domains that are to be considered none of the state’s business, and discourage it from growing. If it is kept small and weak, then the people will be able to prevent abuses without need of fiddly rules. If it is large and strong, then no piece of paper will restrain it.

If the roads, the railways, the banks, the insurance offices, the great joint-stock companies, the universities, and the public charities, were all of them branches of the government; if, in addition, the municipal corporations and local boards, with all that now devolves on them, became departments of the central administration; if the employees of all these different enterprises were appointed and paid by the government, and looked to the government for every rise in life; not all the freedom of the press and popular constitution of the legislature would make this or any other country free otherwise than in name.

J. S. Mill, On Liberty

Murder in George Street

The conclusions will come after all the facts are available, but here are some early thoughts:

First, quibble with the headlines. For the benefit of Times readers, half past seven is not rush hour in Luton town centre. The only people around are those few of us with early starts in London (I aim to reach Canary Wharf for 08:30), and preparation for the business day: cleaning windows, stocking shops, etc. The most coherent account of what happened was that a window cleaner who had been working at M&S was attacked while using the ATM at the Town Hall end of George Street.

The (premature) conclusion is that this was a freak. It’s extremely rare for a police officer to be fatally stabbed while dealing with day-to-day street crime. I wouldn’t like them to go into life-or-death mode every time there’s a fight in the high street. If firearms are around they go into full combat mode and that’s a different matter – it’s a whole lot more dangerous for them and they have to be extremely cautious, which is unpleasant but reasonable. But I would hate to see them acting more “militarily” and less humanly whenever someone has a knife. It would cut them off further from the population and perhaps in net even make them more at risk.

Of course, if I in my comfortable safe job say that the risk of this happening is so small that the police ought to continue to run it – that is, that there should be no reaction of a general kind (changes to procedures, etc.), I must – and do – accept that the specific reaction to this death can be large. After all, if it’s so rare, then we can afford it. I will make sure I remember the name of Jonathan Henry, and remember that he left a family who deserve special respect in Luton, for years to come. Attacks on the police are more serious crimes because they threaten to separate the police from the public in the way I discussed above.

I don’t know whether the large-scale investigation taking place of what seems a straightforward event is just overkill, or a routine response to the use of the baton round, or a routine investigation into how an officer came to be killed. In any case, it is OK. The figure I saw on the ground at 7:35 looked pretty comprehensively disabled, but having been under-cautious the police would have had to jump to being over-cautious.

If the figure on the ground was PC Henry, then there was a screw-up, because one ambulance was already leaving, and another waiting. But I’m over-speculating now. I’ll continue to follow the story as the facts come out.

Intimacy II

Further to my thoughts this morning on the separation of public and intimate relationships, it occured to me that I missed some interesting connections.
I wrote that we need emotional commitment where we can’t achieve commitment via public enforcement (contracts) because the considerations required can’t be specified precisely enough (perhaps because flexibility is itself a key consideration). Possibly more important is the fact we can’t enforce publicly (using the law) something that is supposed to happen in private, without witnesses. This came up before when I defended old-fashioned courtship patterns as a way of avoiding the unpleasantness that can result from being alone without witnesses with an untrusted partner.
The concept that keeps coming up is the cost or difficulty of enforcing any arrangement. Whether I am talking about intimate relationships, the basis of property, the structure of government, law and order, or the business models of entertainment products, it keeps coming up as the decisive factor. Either I have a bee in my bonnet about it, or it is being generally overlooked: treated as a minor implementation detail to be worked out later. Or both, I suppose.

Another stray thought on drawing a boundary around the intimate is Linus Torvalds’ famous quote: Software is like sex — it’s better when it’s free. Taking the idea altogether too seriously, what might there be about the writing of software that makes it more suitable to being motivated by emotional commitment rather than public bargain?
It might just be the undefinability of the requirements. A piece of software isn’t much to look at, it’s very difficult to assess its value in advance. Even if you can determine that it functions correctly, that’s not a complete assessment — quality of software is notoriously difficult to define. If you have the freedom to take what you need from software, that is perhaps more valuable than a predefined functional specification.

Criminal Financing

The latest news on enhanced enforcement of copyright law contains the usual claim from the government that “People should realise that the proceeds from the sale of these goods are used to finance a whole range of criminal activities.”

Sensible people usually ridicule these claims, pointing out that professional criminal activity is generally profitable in its own right, and therefore does not need subsidy from generous counterfeiters.

It is only fair to recognise, however, the plausible rationale behind the “financing” argument.

The likes of Ron Gainsford (the TSI chief exec quoted above) are using the word “finance” in the technical sense of “credit”. What is plausible is that criminal activity is somewhat restricted by lack of access to credit. If you turn up at your local HSBC and tell them you have a promising business opportunity based on robbing a jewellery shop, and you need a £10K loan to cover weapons, a getaway car, a rented safe house, and labour costs for monitoring the activity of the shop for a couple of weeks prior to the raid so that you can exploit this advantageous business opportunity, the bank staff are likely to be even less helpful than the guy in the annoying Nationwide adverts.

To enter a business of this kind, you either need to have the capital yourself, or know someone who has capital and is a criminal. Therefore the less profitable criminal activity there is going on around the place, the more difficulty criminal entrepreneurs will have obtaining credit.

Having recognised the argument, it is possible to dispute it. What is the total value of the trade in counterfeit or infringing goods, compared with, say, that in prohibited drugs. My guess would be approximately zero, meaning that the effect on the availability of criminal credit of effective enforcement would not be significant.

The finance argument also supports a liberal policy of reducing the number of victimless crimes. The most effective way of depriving criminal entrepreneurs of access to loans from drug dealers is to legalise drugs. Boots or Pfizer are no more likely to make loans to armed robbers than are HSBC or Marks and Spencers.

I have another unrelated point on the article which will follow shortly…

Liberty is not best defended by sacrificing liberty

David Davis.

Also, Conservatives formally pledge to cancel ID card scheme

As things stand, I think I will be voting for these buggers for the first time.

Well done to the volunteers at No2ID, who have done so well in keeping the profile of this issue high.

Conservatives Formally pledge to cancel ID card scheme

copied from archive.org, 8 July 2024

 NEWS Monday February 5, 2007 Conservatives formally pledge to cancel ID card scheme Conservatives formally pledge to cancel ID card scheme David Davis has written to Cabinet Secretary, Sir Gus O’Donnell, giving formal notice that an incoming Conservative administration would scrap the Government’s costly ID card project.

And the Shadow Home Secretary has warned of the financial dangers of the Government signing contracts to set up the ID card scheme when it faces cancellation if the Conservatives are returned to power at the next election.

In his letter, Mr Davis asked what provision, if any, has been made in the relevant contractual arrangements to protect the Government – and public funds – against the costs that would be incurred as a result of early cancellation of the scheme; with a similar letter fired off to likely major contractors, warning them of the Party’s intentions.

Just hours before the Conservatives launch a web and print based campaign against Labour’s ID Cards proposals, Mr Davis told Sir Gus: “As you will be aware, the Conservative Party has stated publicly that it is our intention to cancel the ID card project immediately on our being elected to government. You are now formally on notice of our position and fully appraised of the contingent risks and associated liabilities arising from the national identity card scheme.”

Referring to the planned roll out of the Government’s national identity card scheme later this year, Mr Davis reminded the Cabinet Secretary of the longstanding convention that one Parliament may not bind a subsequent Parliament.

He wrote: “I urge you to consider very carefully the Government’s position, in advance of the roll-out of the scheme later this year. As a matter of financial prudence, it is incumbent upon you to ensure that public money is not wasted, and contractual obligations are not incurred, investing in a scheme with such a high risk of not being implemented.

“In particular, I would be interested to know what provision, if any, has been made in the relevant contractual arrangements to protect the Government – and public funds – against the costs that would be incurred as a result of early cancellation of the scheme.

Religious Freedom

The obvious question that hits first when looking at the recent furore over whether a church-run adoption agency should be allowed to apply its religious principles in a manner that would be illegal for anyone else, is: Why on earth should a church have special privileges?

It is quite common for governments to allocate privileges to religion. It’s difficult at first to see why this should be. Of course, it might be logical to privilege one specific religion, if that one is believed to be “true”. However, that logic cannot account for generic religious privileges. The lack of underlying logic to the position is exposed by those playing with the boundary of what constitutes a religion (via Volokh.)

Looking at the question historically, the answer is immediately obvious: religions get extra freedoms, because when they don’t, they fight. The lesson of history is, that you can take away all sorts of freedom with impunity, but if you obstruct people observing their religion, you’re risking violent resistance.

If you see politics, as I do, as a compromise between interests (rather than, say, a search for Justice), then this situation is OK. A preference that is held strongly enough to arouse violence is more important than one which is not. (Irrespective of the objective merit of the preference). There is a long-term issue that this attitude is encouraging violence, but that is very long-term in this situation, where the deference to religion in itself has grown over centuries. Responding promptly to violence, such as that of the animal rights movement, would be much more problematic than this slow adaptation to the existence of potentially violent religious movements.

The same incentive problem applies to rolling back the by now time-honoured privileges of religion. If we reason that because the Catholic / gay adoption issue isn’t likely to turn violent, we don’t need to worry, then we’re penalising peaceability. This concern is highlighted by the recent YouTube spat where a prominent atheist who has long published criticisms of Christianity is banned as soon as he starts making similar criticisms of Islam.

On the other hand, if new movements seek to claim the time-honoured status of religion, it is reasonable to ascertain whether they are “real” religions according to the only criterion that matters – whether they are likely to eventually turn violent. Therefore, our new Muslim communities succeed, and the Jedi of Brighton and the Brethren of Georgetown fail.